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Abstract— Consensus is an important building block for
building replicated systems, and many consensus protocols
have been proposed. In this paper, we show that many
consensus protocols can be derived from the same simple
genes. We present these genes in the form of a skeleton
algorithm that can be configured to produce, among others,
three well-known consensus protocols: Paxos, Chandra-
Toueg, and Ben-Or. Although each of these protocols
specify only one quorum system explicity, we show that
all employ a second quorum system. We use the skeleton
algorithm to implement a replicated service, allowing us
to compare the performance of these consensus protocols
under various workloads and failure scenarios. From this
we learn, for example, that weak leader election in Paxos
unnecessarily causes performance degradation in certain
failure scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computers will fail, and for many systems it is
imperative that such failures be tolerated. Replication,
the general approach toward fault tolerance, requires a
protocol for replicas to agree on values or actions. The
original agreement or consensus problem was proposed
in [1]. Many versions of the problem and corresponding
solutions have been introduced since (see [2] for a
survey of just the first decade, containing well over 100
references).
This paper focuses on protocols for Internet-like sys-
tems in which there are no real-time bounds on execution
or message latency. Such systems are often termed
asynchronous. While published asynchronous consensus
protocols may at first appear complex and quite different
from each other, we claim that all these protocols are
derived from the same simple genes.
This paper makes three contributions:
• We present the genes of consensus algorithms in the
form of a skeleton algorithm that can be configured
to produce various consensus protocols. The skele-
ton algorithm gives insight into how consensus pro-
tocols work, and we learn that consensus requires
not one but two separate quorum systems;
• We demonstrate how this approach can be used to
instantiate three well-known consensus protocols:
Paxos [3], Chandra-Toueg [4], and Ben-Or [5];
• We implement our approach and present a perfor-
mance comparison of these protocols under varying
workload and crash failures. We learn interesting
trade-offs between various design choices in con-
sensus algorithms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the consensus problem and proposes
terminology for discussing various consensus protocols.
Before we present our skeleton, we need to introduce
extended quorum systems as a building block in Sec-
tion III. Section IV describes the skeleton, while Sec-
tion V illustrates instantiations. Section VI describes
the implementation of the skeleton and compares three
well-known consensus protocols. Section VII concludes.
Appendices I and II contain correctness proofs.
2II. THE CONSENSUS PROBLEM
In prior work, there has been neither agreement nor
consensus on terminology. We propose nomenclature for
talking about the consensus problem and protocols to
solve it (see Table I).
In the consensus problem there is a set of proposers,
each of which can propose a proposal, and a set of
deciders, each of which decides one of the proposals.
The goal is to ensure each non-faulty decider decides
the same proposal, even in the face of faulty proposers.
We must specify the execution and failure model of
nodes (computers that run programs) and links (network
connections between nodes). Nodes run actors, which
are either proposers or deciders. A node may run both a
proposer and a decider—in practice, the proposer often
would like to learn the outcome of the agreement.
Nodes are either honest, executing programs faithfully,
or Byzantine [6], exhibiting arbitrary behavior. We will
also use the terms correct and faulty, but not as alter-
natives to honest and Byzantine. A correct node is an
honest node that always eventually makes progress. A
faulty node is a Byzantine node or an honest node that
has crashed or will eventually crash. Note that honest
and Byzantine are mutually exclusive, as are correct and
faulty. However, a node can be both honest and faulty.
We assume that each pair of nodes is connected by
a link, which is a bi-directional reliable virtual circuit
that ensures messages sent on this link are delivered,
eventually, and in the order in which they were sent
(i.e., an honest sender keeps retransmitting a message
until it receives an acknowledgment or crashes). Also,
the receiver can tell who sent a message (e.g., using
MACs), so a Byzantine node cannot forge a message
so it appears like a message sent by an honest node.
Because our system is asynchronous, we do not as-
sume timing bounds on execution of programs or on
latency of communication. We also do not assume that
a node on one side of a link can determine whether
the node on the other side of the link is correct or
faulty. Timeouts cannot reliably detect faulty nodes in
an asynchronous system, even if only crash failures are
allowed.
Why is consensus hard? Consider the following straw-
man protocol: each decider collects proposals from
all proposers, determines the minimum proposal from
among the proposals it receives (in case it received
multiple proposals), and decides on that one. If there
were no faulty nodes at all, such a protocol would work,
albeit limited in speed by the slowest node or link.
Unfortunately, even if only crash failures are possible,
deciders do not know how long to wait for proposers.
If deciders were to use time-outs, they might time-out
on different proposers, and these deciders would decide
different proposals as a result. Thus each decider has no
choice but to wait until it has received a proposal from
all proposers. If one of the proposers is faulty, such a
decider will never decide.
In an asynchronous system with crash failures (Byzan-
tine failures comprise crash failures), there exists no
deterministic protocol in which all correct deciders even-
tually decide [7] (a result called FLP after the people that
showed this impossibility, Fisher, Lynch, and Patterson).
We can circumvent this limitation by not requiring that
all correct deciders eventually decide. Instead, we will
require only that the consensus protocol cannot reach a
state in which some correct decider can never decide.
The strawman protocol of deciding the minimum pro-
posal can reach a state in which deciders wait indefinitely
for a faulty proposer, and is, therefore, not a consensus
protocol, even with our weaker requirement.
A protocol that solves the consensus problem must
have the following three properties:
Definition: Agreement: If two honest deciders decide,
they decide the same proposal.
Definition: Validity: If all honest proposers propose the
same proposal v, then an honest decider that decides will
decide v.
Definition: Non-Blocking: Given any run of the pro-
tocol that reaches a state in which a particular correct
decider has not yet decided, there exists a continuation of
the run in which that decider does decide on a proposal.
To abstract the interaction that takes place in agree-
ment algorithms we describe a mechanism through
3term description aka
actor proposer, decider, selector, or registrar
Byzantine potentially exhibits arbitrary behavior
correct honest and makes progress eventually
crashed halted execution indefinitely
decider actor who wants to decide
faulty Byzantine or stops making progress
guarded set contains at least one honest participant
honest not Byzantine (but may crash)
instance phase in protocol
(network) link connects two participants
node hardware on which actor runs
participant member of a quorum system
proposal initial value submitted to protocol
proposer actor whose role is to propose a value
quorum (set) any two quorums of participants intersect
quorum system structure on set of actors
registrar actor that prevents multiple decisions
selector actor that suggests decisions
suggestion proposal + instance identifier
max-wait set maximal set of participants one can wait for
TABLE I
TERMINOLOGY.
which messages are exchanged. The mechanism is based
on the notion of quorum systems, which we now review
and extend.
III. EXTENDED QUORUM SYSTEMS
Before we introduce our skeleton algorithm, we in-
troduce a useful building block. An extended quorum
system is a quadruple (P,M,Q,G). P is a set of
nodes called the participants. M,Q, and G are each a
collection of subsets of participants (that is, each is a
subset of 2P ).M is the collection of maximal-wait sets,
Q the collection of quorum sets, and G the collection of
guarded sets. Each is defined below.
A subset of P is a guarded set if and only if it is
guaranteed to contain at least one honest participant.
Note that a guarded set may consist of a single par-
ticipant that may be crashed but is not Byzantine. As an
example, consider an (n, t)-threshold quorum system, a
system with n participants, of which at most t are faulty.
In the case of crash failures only, the guarded sets are all
non-empty subsets of P . In the Byzantine case, guarded
sets have to be of size larger than t in order to guarantee
that they contain at least one honest participant.
When requesting information from all participants,
crashed or Byzantine participants may never respond.
An actor often tries to collect as many responses to a
broadcast request as possible, but has to stop collecting
additional responses when it is in danger of waiting
indefinitely. M characterizes this—it is a set of subsets
of P , none contained in another, such that some M ∈M
contains all the correct nodes.1 In a threshold quorum
system, the maximal-wait sets are all subsets of n − t
participants, where n is the number of nodes and t is the
maximum number of failures.
Quorums are sets of nodes that satisfy Consistency:
Definition: Consistency: An extended quorum system
satisfies Consistency if and only if the intersection of
any two quorums (including a quorum with itself) is
guaranteed to contain an honest participant. (In other
words, the intersection of two quorums is a guarded set.)
To illustrate, consider how consistency can be satisfied
in an (n, t)-threshold system. With only crash failures
possible, consistency requires that quorums be larger
than n/2 participants, because two strict majorities al-
ways intersect, and no participants are Byzantine. When
Byzantine failures are possible, consistency requires
having quorums be larger than size (n + t)/2. To see
why this works, consider any two quorums. Without
removing duplicates, the sets together have more than
n+ t elements. But there are only n participants, so the
intersection must contain more than t participants, and
thus contains at least one honest participant.
Definition: Availability: An extended quorum system
satisfies Availability iff every maximal-wait set contains
a quorum.
Because Availability requires that every maximal-wait
set contains a quorum, we get that n − t > n/2, or
n > 2t, putting a lower bound on n. We obtain that
n− t > (n+ t)/2, or n > 3t.
1For those familiar with Byzantine Quorum Systems [8],M is the
set of complements of the fail-prone system B. For the purposes of
this paper, it is often more convenient to talk about maximal-wait
sets.
4Crash Byzantine
guarded set (in G) > 0 > t
quorum set (in Q) > n/2 > (n+ t)/2
maximal-wait set (in M) = n− t = n− t
set of participants (P) > 2t > 5t
TABLE II
SIZE REQUIREMENTS FOR THRESHOLD QUORUM SYSTEMS THAT
SATISFY CONSISTENCY AND OPAQUENESS.
Availability requires that quorums can have no more
than n − t elements, otherwise there would exist
maximal-wait sets that do not contain a quorum.
In this paper, we will also require that extended
quorum systems satisfy Opaqueness [8]:2
Definition: Opaqueness: An extended quorum system
satisfies Opaqueness if and only if each maximal-wait
set contains a quorum consisting entirely of honest
participants.
We illustrate what this requirement means for (n, t)-
threshold quorum systems. In a crash failure model,
opaqueness requires that every maximal-wait set contains
a quorum, so we get that n−t > n/2, or n > 2t, placing
a lower bound on n. In the Byzantine model, t of the
participants in a maximal-wait set may be Byzantine.
Thus we have to require that n− 2t > (n+ t)/2, which
simplifies to n > 5t. Table II summarizes requirements
for P , M, Q, and G in (n, t)-threshold systems.
The simplest example of quorum systems are thresh-
old quorum systems, but other quorum systems may
be more appropriate for particular applications. See [9]
and [8] for advantages and disadvantages of various
quorum systems for crash and arbitrary failure models
respectively.
One degenerate extended quorum system, used in
some well-known consensus protocols, is a leader ex-
tended quorum system: There is one participant (the
leader), and that participant by itself forms the only
maximal-wait set in M, quorum in Q, and guarded set
2Opaqueness is a stronger property than Availability typically
required of quorum systems, as Availability only requires that each
maximal-wait set contain a quorum, possibly including Byzantine
members.
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Fig. 1. The actions of the various actors.
in G. Because quorum sets have to satisfy consistency,
the leader has to be honest.
IV. THE CONSENSUS SKELETON
In Section II, we presented a strawman consensus
protocol that, in the presence of faulty nodes, may reach
a state where deciders can never decide. To avoid this,
consensus protocols invoke multiple instances, where an
instance is an execution of a protocol that, once started,
runs in isolation. Instances have also been called rounds,
phases, or ballots.
In order to guarantee consistency among decisions
of deciders in the presence of multiple instances, we
introduce two new types of actors in addition to pro-
posers and deciders, namely registrars and selectors.3
A proposer sends its proposal to the selectors. Selectors
and registrars exchange messages and occasionally regis-
trars inform deciders about potential values for decision.
Deciders apply some filter to reach a decision.
The actions of the various actors are summarized in
Figure 1. Broadly speaking, the objective of selectors is
to reach a decision within an instance, while the objective
of registrars is to maintain a collective memory that
ensures that decisions are maintained across instances,
preventing conflicting decisions.
A. Instances
An instance decides a proposal if an honest decider
decides a proposal in that instance. All honest deciders
3As stated before, a node may run multiple actors, although each
can run at most one registrar and at most one selector.
5that decide in an instance must be guaranteed to decide
the same proposal, so an instance cannot decide multiple
proposals. It is not guaranteed that an instance decides
any proposal. By having multiple instances, if one in-
stance does not decide, then future ones may decide. It is
important to guarantee that if multiple instances decide,
they decide the same proposal.
Instances are identified by instance identifiers r from
a totally ordered set that we will call N¯ (can be, but
does not have to be, N). Instance identifiers induce an
ordering on instances, and we say that one instance is
before or after another instance, but keep in mind that
instances may execute concurrently.
We name proposals v, w, .... Within an instance, pro-
posals are paired with instance identifiers. We call a pair
(r, v) a suggestion, where v is the proposal and r an
instance identifier. A special suggestion ⊥ is used to
indicate absence of a specific proposal.
Selectors select proposals, and registrars register sug-
gestions. Each registrar keeps careful track of the last
suggestion that it has registered. The initial registered
suggestion of a registrar is ⊥.
A new instance starts with the registrars sending their
current registered suggestions to the selectors. (Exactly
how an instance starts depends on the complete design of
the consensus protocol, and will be addressed later.) Each
selector determines if one of the suggestions it receives
could have been decided in a previous instance. If so, it
selects the corresponding proposal (of which there can be
at most one). If not, it selects one of the proposals issued
by the proposers. The selector creates a suggestion from
the selected proposal using the current instance identifier,
and sends the suggestion to the registrars.
If a registrar receives the same suggestion from a
quorum of selectors (that is, all selectors in the quorum
sent the same instance identifier and proposal), it (i) reg-
isters the suggestion, and (ii) broadcasts the suggestion
to the deciders. If a decider receives the same suggestion
from a quorum of registrars, the decider decides the
corresponding proposal in those suggestions.
B. Guarded Proposal
Selectors have to be careful not to select proposals
that could conflict with prior decisions. Before selecting
a proposal in an instance, a selector obtains a set of
suggestions L from each participant in a maximal-wait
set of registrars. A proposal v is a potential-proposal
if L contains suggestions containing v from a guarded
set. This means that at least one honest registrar sent
a suggestion containing v. The selector computes the
guarded proposal of L, if any, as follows:
1) Consider each potential-proposal v separately:
a) Consider all subsets of suggestions contain-
ing v from guarded sets of registrars. The
minimum instance identifier in a subset is
called a guarded-instance-identifier;
b) The maximum among the guarded-instance-
identifiers for v is called the associated-
instance-identifier of v. (Note that because
v is a potential-proposal, there has to be at
least one guarded-instance-identifier and thus
the maximum is well-defined.) The support-
sets for v are those subsets of suggestions for
which the guarded-instance-identifier is the
associated-instance-identifier;
2) Among the potential-proposals, select all proposals
with the maximal associated-instance-identifier. If
there is exactly one such potential-proposal v′,
and v′ 6= ⊥, then this is the guarded proposal.
Otherwise there is no guarded proposal.
For example, consider a Byzantine threshold quorum
system Q with t = 2 and n = 11. Thus, a quorum
has to have more than (n + t)/2 elements, which is
7 or more in our case, and a maximal-wait set has
to contain at least n − t = 9 elements. A guarded
set has at least t + 1 = 3 elements. Now consider
the following suggestions in the maximal-wait set: 4
suggestions with the value (3,green), 2 suggestions
with the value (5,green), and 3 suggestions with the
value (4,red). Both green and red are potential-
proposals. The maximum instance identifier among sets
of 3 suggestions for green is 3, as there are only 2
suggestions with instance identifier 5. The maximum
6instance identifier among sets of 3 suggestions for red
(there is only one such set) is 4, thus 4 is the maximum
associated-instance-identifier. Because red is the only
proposal with an associated-instance-identifier of 4, red
is the guarded proposal even though there are twice as
many suggestions supporting green!
For benign systems, the guarded proposal in an (n, t)-
threshold quorum system is simply the proposal cor-
responding to the maximum instance identifier in L.
For Byzantine systems, divide the suggestions in L by
proposal, and sort each subset by instance identifier.
Consider the proposal with the highest t + 1st instance
identifier. If there is exactly one of these, this is the
guarded proposal.
Note that in protocols in which instances are invoked
one after the other completes, sequentially, associated-
instance-identifier will always be the identifier of the
previous instance.
We prove in Appendix I that if a decider obtains
suggestions (r, v) from a quorum of registrars (and con-
sequently decides), then any honest selectors in instances
≥ r are guaranteed to compute a guarded proposal v′
such that v′ = v (unless they crash). If a selector fails
to compute a guarded proposal in a particular instance
then this is both evidence that no prior instance can have
decided and a guarantee that no prior instance will ever
decide. However, the reverse is not true. If a selector
computes a guarded proposal v′, it is not guaranteed that
v′ is or will be decided.
C. Extended Quorum System API
Participants of an extended quorum system
send and receive messages of the form
〈message-type, instance, source, suggestion〉. The source
indicates the sending node.
An extended quorum system E = (P,M,Q,G) has
the following interface:
- E .broadcast(m): send a message m to all partici-
pants in P;
- E .wait(pattern): wait for messages, matching the
given pattern (specifies, for example, the message
type and instance number). When the sources of the
collected messages form an element or a superset
of an element ofM, then return the set of collected
messages;
- E .uni-quorum(set of messages): if the set of mes-
sages contains the same suggestion from a quorum,
then return that suggestion.4 Otherwise, return ⊥;
- E .guarded-proposal(set of messages): return the
guarded proposal among these messages, or ⊥ if
there is none.
D. State Maintenance
Each selector and registrar is associated with an
instance, which is the instance it is currently sending
messages in, and receiving messages from. A registrar
can change the instance with which it is associated,
progressing to a later instance after aborting the current
one. A selector can also progress to later instances, but
unlike a registrar it is allowed to keep participating in
older instances.
The instance protocol uses not one but two extended
quorum systems:
1) Registrars form an extended quorum systemR that
is the same for all instances. R has to satisfy con-
sistency and opaqueness. Selectors use R to find
the guarded proposal, if any, to select proposals
that do not conflict with earlier decisions.
2) Selectors form an extended quorum system Sr,
which may be different for each instance r. Each
Sr has to satisfy both consistency and opaqueness
as well. Registrars in instance r use quorums of
Sr to avoid having two registrars register different
suggestions within the same instance.
Deciders, although technically not part of an instance,
do try to obtain the same suggestion from a quorum of
registrars in each instance. We associate deciders with
instances for simplicity of presentation. Also for conve-
nience, we will have deciders form an extended quorum
system D. However, deciders never send messages, and
thus we will only use D to send messages to all deciders.
4By the consistency property, there can be at most one such
suggestion.
7Each selector i maintains a set Pi containing proposals
it received (across instances). A selector waits for at
least one proposal before participating in the rest of the
protocol, so Pi is never empty during execution of the
protocol. (Typically, Pi first contains a proposal from the
proposer on the same node as selector i.) For simplicity
we assume an honest proposer sends a single proposal.
The details of how Pi is formed and used are different for
different agreement protocols, so this will be discussed
when the full protocols are presented. Pi has an operation
Pi.pick(r) that returns either a single proposal from the
set or some value as a function of r. Different protocols
use different approaches for selecting that value, and
these will also be discussed later.
Registrars are assumed to have state that survives
crashes and recoveries. In particular, a registrar j running
on an honest node maintains:
rj : current instance identifier;
cj : last registered suggestion, initially ⊥ .
Both increase monotonically over time.
E. The Instance Mechanism
A protocol execution is a collection of instance exe-
cutions. Figure 2 shows the mechanism that enables the
execution of an individual instance. We call this the in-
stance mechanism. A protocol execution starts when the
first instance execution starts. How instances are invoked
is different for different protocols, and some ways are
described in Section V. The extended quorum systems
used in the instance protocol determines the potential
participants in each instance and is also protocol specific.
Potential participants execute in an instance once pre-
conditions for their actions are satisfied.
Lemma 1: In the mechanism in Figure 2,
(a) if any honest registrar i computes a suggestion
qri 6= ⊥ in Step (R.2) of instance r, then any honest
registrar that computes a non-⊥ suggestion in that
step of that instance, computes the same suggestion.
(b) if any honest decider k computes a suggestion
drk 6= ⊥ in Step (D.2) of instance r, then any honest
decider that computes a non-⊥ suggestion in that
step of that instance, computes the same suggestion.
At the start of instance r, each registrar i executes:
(R.0) send ci to all participants (selectors) in Sr:
Sr.broadcast(〈select, r, i, ci〉)
Each selector j in Sr executes:
(S.1) wait for select messages from registrars:
Lrj := R.wait(〈select, r, ∗, ∗〉);
(S.2) see if there is a guarded proposal:
vrj := R.guarded-proposal(Lrj);
(S.3) if not, select from received proposals instead:
if vrj = ⊥ then vrj := Pj .pick(r) fi;
(S.4) send a suggestion to all registrars:
R.broadcast(〈register, r, j, (r, vrj )〉);
Each registrar i (still in instance r) executes:
(R.1) wait for register messages from selectors:
Mri := Sr.wait(〈register, r, ∗, ∗〉);
(R.2) see if there is a unanimous suggestion from a
quorum:
qri := Sr.uni-quorum(Mri );
(R.3) register the suggestion:
ci := if qri = ⊥ then (r,⊥) else qri fi;
(R.4) send the suggestion to all deciders:
D.broadcast(〈decide, r, i, ci〉)
Each decider k executes:
(D.1) wait for decide messages from registrars:
Nrk := R.wait(〈decide, r, ∗, ∗〉);
(D.2) see if there is a unanimous suggestion from a
quorum:
drk := R.uni-quorum(Nrk );
(D.3) if there is, and not ⊥, decide:
if ( drk = (r, v′) and v′ 6= ⊥ ) then decide
v′ fi;
Fig. 2. An instance of the consensus protocol.
Proof: Case (a): in the set of suggestions contained
in M ri collected in Step (R.1) Sr.uni-quorum must have
identified a unanimous suggestion qri 6= ⊥ from a quo-
rum of selectors Qri . Consider another honest registrar
j that completes Step (R.2) of instance r, computing a
unanimous suggestion qrj for q
r
j 6= ⊥ from a quorum Qrj .
By the consistency property on Sr, Qri
⋂
Qrj contains
an honest selector. An honest selector always sends the
same suggestion to all registrars, implying qri = q
r
j .
8The case for the deciders (b) is similar although it
is based on the consistency property on R, since the
deciders require a unanimous suggestion from a quorum
of registrars in instance r before deciding.
Note that Step (S.2) does not have the property of
Lemma 1 because selectors do not try to obtain a
unanimous suggestion from a quorum.
Corollary 2: In the mechanism in Figure 2, if any
honest registrar registers a suggestion (r, v) with v 6= ⊥
in Step (R.3) of instance r, then any honest registrar that
registers a suggestion with non-⊥ proposal in that step
of that instance, registers the same suggestion.
Proof: By Lemma 1 all honest registrars, unless
they crash, compute the same suggestion or ⊥ in (R.2).
Those that computed a non-⊥ suggestion therefore reg-
ister the same suggestion in (R.3).
Note that they will also end up sending the same non-
⊥ suggestion in (R.4) of that instance.
Note that the following lemma holds for all instances
other than the first one. Our model does not constraint
the initial suggestions the registrars hold.
Lemma 3: In the mechanism in Figure 2, if any honest
registrar sends a suggestion (r¯, v) with v 6= ⊥ in
Step (R.0) of instance r then any honest registrar that
sends a suggestion (r¯, v′) with v′ 6= ⊥ in that step of
that instance, sends the same proposal, i.e., v = v′.
Proof: By Corollary 2 all honest registrars that
register a suggestion in instance r¯ based on the same
non-⊥ proposal register the same suggestion in (R.3).
Therefore, if their suggestions sent in (R.0) of instance
r were registered with a non-⊥ suggestion in (R.3) of
the same instance r¯, they send the same suggestions.
Lemma 4: In the mechanism in Figure 2,
(a) if each honest selector that completes Step (S.4)
of instance r sends the same suggestion, then any
honest registrar that completes Step (R.2) of that
instance computes the same suggestion;
(b) if each honest registrar that completes Step (R.4)
of instance r sends the same suggestion, then any
honest decider that completes Step (D.2) of that
instance computes the same suggestion;
(c) if each honest registrar that completes Step (R.0)
of instance r sends the same suggestion, then any
honest selector that completes Step (S.2) of that
instance computes the same proposal.
Proof: Case (a): assume the conditions of the
lemma with respect to each honest selector completing
Step (S.4) of instance r. Each registrar that completes
Step (R.1) collects suggestions from a maximal-wait set
of selectors. By definition, each quorum contains at least
one honest selector. Therefore, the set M ri of instance r
of any honest registrar i cannot contain a unanimous
suggestion for a suggestion different from what all the
honest selectors have broadcast in Step (S.4). Opaque-
ness requires that every maximal-wait set contains a
quorum of honest participants, therefore, every honest
registrar that completes Step (R.2) of instance r will
end up having a unanimous suggestion from a quorum
of selectors, and will compute the same suggestion.
Case (b) is similar to the first case, and follows
because each honest decider will eventually receive
decide messages for the same suggestion sent by a
quorum of honest registrars in Step (R.4).
We now proof case (c) in which each honest registrar
that completes Step (R.0) sends the same registered sug-
gestion. Notice that each set of suggestions Lri contains
at least the suggestions from a guarded set of honest
registrars, and cannot contain suggestions from a guarded
set of Byzantine registrars. Since each honest registrar
sends the same suggestion, no honest selector will find
a unanimous suggestion from a guarded set of registrars
for any proposal contained in the suggestion of the
honest registrars. Each selector will have a unanimous
suggestion sent by a guarded set of honest registrars,
and therefore will end up computing the same proposal
at the end of Step (S.2).
And now we address the last and most important
property we need to prove:
Lemma 5: The mechanism in Figure 2 satisfies that
if r′ is the earliest instance in which a proposal w is
decided by some honest decider, then for any instance
r, r > r′, if an honest registrar registers a suggestion in
Step (R.3), it is (r, w).
Proof:
Since all instances are taken from a fully ordered set,
any subset of them are fully ordered. The proof will
9be by induction on all the instances, past instance r′,
in which eventually some honest registrar registers a
suggestion.
Let w 6= ⊥ be the proposal decided by an honest
decider in Step (D.2) of instance r′. Let Qr′ ∈ R be
the quorum in instance r′ whose suggestions caused the
decider to decide w.
Let r1 > r′ be the first instance past r′ at which
some honest registrar eventually completes Step (R.3).
Since this registrar completes Step (R.3), it must have
received register messages from a maximal-wait
set of selectors following Step (R.1) of instance r1.
Each honest selector that sent such a message received
select messages from a maximal-wait set of registrars
that were sent in their Step (R.0) of instance r1. Each
honest registrar that completes Step (R.0) did not register
any new suggestion in any instance r′′, r′ < r′′ < r1,
because r1 is the first such instance. Moreover, the
registrar will not register such a suggestion in the future,
since it aborted all such instances r′′ before sending its
select message in Step (R.0) of instance r1.
In Step (R.0) a registrar sends the last suggestion it
had registered. Some registrars may send suggestions
they had registered prior to instance r′ while some other
registrars send suggestions they registered in Step (R.4)
of instance r′.
Each honest selector j awaits a set of messages Lj
from a maximal-wait set in Step (S.1). Lj has to contain
suggestions from a quorum Qr1 consisting entirely of
honest registrars (by the opaqueness property of R).
By the consistency property of R the intersection of
Qr1 and Qr
′
has to contain a guarded set, and thus
Qr1 has to contain suggestions from a guarded set of
honest registrars that registered (r′, w). There cannot be
such a set of suggestions for a later instance, prior to
r1. By Corollary 2 and Lemma 3, there cannot be any
suggestions from a guarded set for a different proposal
in instance r′. Thus, each honest selector will select a
non-⊥ proposal and those proposals are identical.
By Lemma 4, every honest registrar that completes
Step (R.4) will register the same suggestion, thus the
proof holds for r1.
Now assume that the claim holds for all instances r′′,
r′ < r′′ < r, and we will prove it for instance r.
There is an honest registrar that completes Step (R.3)
in instance r and registers (r, w). Following Step (R.1)
of instance r it must have received register messages
from a maximal-wait set of selectors. Each honest selec-
tor that sent such a message received select messages
from a maximal-wait set of registrars that were sent in
Step (R.0) of instance r.
Each honest registrar sends the last suggestion it had
registered. Some honest registrars may send suggestions
they had registered prior to instance r′ while some
other honest registrars send suggestions they registered in
Step (R.4) of instance r′′, r′ ≤ r′′ < r. By the induction
hypothesis, all honest registrars that send a suggestion
that was registered past instance r′ use the proposal w
in their suggestion.
In instance r, each honest selector j awaits a set of
messages Lj from a maximal-wait set in Step (S.1). Lj
has to contain suggestions from a quorum Qr consisting
entirely of honest registrars (by the opaqueness property
of R). By the consistency property of R the intersection
of Qr and Qr
′
has to contain a guarded set, and thus Qr
has to contain suggestions from a guarded set of honest
registrars that registered (r′, w) in instance r′, and may
have registered (r′′, w) in some later instance. Therefore,
selector j obtains w as a possible potential-proposal.
Since all honest registrars that register a suggestion past
instance r′ register the same proposal, there is a support-
set for w with associated-instance-identifier r¯ ≥ r′.
There cannot be any other possible potential-proposal
with an associated-instance-identifier later than r′, since,
by induction, no honest registrar registers a suggestion
with a different proposal later than r′. Therefore, each
honest selector will select the proposal w. By Lemma 4,
every honest registrar that will complete Step (R.4) will
register the same suggestion, thus the proof holds for r.
We now formulate and prove the main theorem about
instances:
Theorem 6 (Agreement): If two honest deciders de-
cide, they decide the same proposal.
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Proof: If the deciders decide in the same instance,
the result follows from Lemma 1. Say one decider
decides v′ in instance r′, and another decider decides
v in instance r, with r′ < r. By Lemma 5, all honest
registrars that register in instance r register (r, v′). By
the consistency property of R, an honest decider can
only decide (r, v′) in instance r, and thus v = v′.
V. FULL PROTOCOLS
The description of instances above does not specify
how instances are created, how broadcasts are done in
steps (R.0), (S.4), and (R.4), what specific extended
quorum systems to use for R and Sr, how a selector
j obtains proposals for Pj , or how j selects a proposal
from Pj . We now show how Paxos [3], the algorithm
by Chandra and Toueg [4], and the early protocol by
Michael Ben-Or [5] make these choices. They use the
instance protocol as a subroutine. For the sake of brevity,
we do not include the proofs of the validity and non-
blocking properties of these protocols. For a sketch of
the proof, please refer to Appendix II.
A. Paxos
Paxos [3] was originally designed only for honest
systems. In Paxos, any node can create an instance r at
any time, and it becomes the leader of that instance. The
choice of leader is governed by a weak leader election
protocol (see [3]) that is outside the scope of this paper.
The leader creates a unique instance identifier r from its
node identifier and a sequence number per node that is
incremented for each new instance created on that node.
The leader runs both a proposer and a selector. Sr is a
leader extended quorum system consisting only of the
selector at the leader.
The leader starts the instance by broadcasting a
prepare message containing the instance identifier to
all registrars. (This broadcast is not part of the instance
protocol of Figure 2.) Upon receipt, a registrar i first
checks that r > ri, and, if so, sets ri to r and proceeds
with Step (R.0). Note that since there is only one
participant in Sr, the broadcast in (R.0) is actually a
point-to-point message back to the leader, now acting
as selector. In Step (S.3), if the leader has to pick a
proposal from Pj , it selects the proposal by the local
proposer, thus there is no need for proposers to send
their proposals to all selectors.
Validity follows directly from the absence of Byzan-
tine participants. To see why Paxos is Non-Blocking,
consider a state in which some correct decider has not yet
decided. Now consider the following continuation of the
run: one of the correct nodes creates a new instance with
an instance identifier higher than used before. Because
there are always correct nodes and there is an infinite
number of instance identifiers, this is always possible.
The node sends a prepare message to all registrars. All
honest registrars start in Step (R.0) of the instance on
receipt, so the selector at the leader will receive sufficient
select messages in Step (S.1) to continue. Due to
Lemma 4, and the fact that there is only one selector in
Sr, all honest registrars register the same suggestion in
Step (R.3). The deciders will each receive a unanimous
suggestion from a quorum of registrars in Step (D.1) and
decide in Step (D.3).
B. Chandra-Toueg
The Chandra-Toueg algorithm is another consensus
protocol that is designed for honest systems [4]. The
Chandra-Toueg algorithm requires a coordinator in each
instance. The role of the coordinator is similar to the
leader in Paxos. However, unlike Paxos, Chandra-Toueg
does not use a leader election protocol. Instead, the
coordinator of each instance is defined by a simple
mod of the instance number by the number of nodes
in the system, i.e., the role of the coordinator rotates
from node to node at the end of each instance. Each
node in the system is both a proposer and a registrar.
For each instance r, the selector quorum Sr is the
extended quorum consisting only of the coordinator of
that instance.
To start the protocol, a proposer sends a proposal
message to all nodes. Upon receiving the first proposal,
a registrar starts in instance 0 and executes (R.0). The
coordinator of each instance starts (S.0) upon receiving a
select message for that instance. In (S.3), Pi.pick(r)
will simply return the first proposal that was received
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by the coordinator. Registrars that successfully complete
(R.1-4) move to the next instance.
Note that when registrars are waiting for a register
message from the selector of a particular instance, they
are not guaranteed to receive a reply because the coordi-
nator of that instance can fail. Registrars thus have to be
prepared to timeout. When this happens, the registrars
starts executing (R.0) in the next instance, which would
have a different coordinator. When a registrar receives a
register message with a larger instance number than
the one it is currently in, it aborts the current instance and
skips forward to the instance of the register message.
In the original description of the Chandra-Toueg al-
gorithm, the coordinator for an instance is also the
decider for that instance. This means that in order for
all nodes to become aware of a decision, the coordinator
has to broadcast an announcement. We can modify the
Chandra-Toueg algorithm such that all nodes are deciders
in all instances without affecting the rest of the protocol.
The effect of this change is the elimination of one round
of communication while increasing the number of mes-
sages that are sent in (R.4) of the instance mechanism.
This is similar to the algorithm proposed in [10]. A
comparison of the original Chandra-Toueg algorithm and
this modified version was proposed in [11].
As in the case of Paxos, Validity follows directly
from the absence of Byzantine participants. The Non-
blocking property follows from that fact that a honest,
correct selector can always receive sufficient select
messages in (S.1) to continue. All honest registrars will
always receive the same suggestion in (R.3) since there is
only one selector in each instance. If the coordinator for
an instance fails, registrars for that instance will timeout
and move to the next instance.
C. Ben-Or
In this early protocol [5], each node runs a proposer,
a selector, a registrar, and a decider. Instances are num-
bered 1, 2, .... Proposals are either 0 or 1 (that is, this
is a binary consensus protocol), and each Pi = {0, 1}.
Pi.pick(r) selects the local proposer’s proposal for the
first instance, or a random one in later instances.
Each of the selectors, registrars, and deciders starts in
instance 1 and runs a loop. A selector j runs a loop
consisting of steps (S.1) through (S.4), incrementing
rj right after Step (S.4). A registrar i runs a loop
consisting of steps (R.0) through (R.4), incrementing ri
after Step (R.4). Note that the broadcasts in steps (R.0)
and (R.4) are to the same destination nodes and happen
in consecutive steps, so they can be merged into a single
broadcast, resulting in just two broadcasts per instance.
Finally, a decider k runs a loop consisting of steps (D.1)
through (D.3), incrementing rk after Step (D.3).
Sr is the same as R for every instance r; both
consist of all nodes and uses a threshold quorum system.
Ben-Or works equally well in honest and Byzantine
environments as long as opaqueness is satisfied. It can be
easily shown that if a decider decides, all other deciders
decide either in the same or the next instance. This
suggests an easy termination rule.
Validity follows from the rule that selectors select
the locally proposed proposal in the first instance: If all
selectors select the same proposal v, by Lemma 4 the
registrars register v, and, by the opaqueness property of
R, the deciders decide v. The Non-Blocking property
follows from the rule that honest selectors pick their
proposals at random in all but the first instance, and so
it is always possible that they pick the same proposal,
after which decision in Step (D.3) is guaranteed because
of the opaqueness property of R.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROTOCOL
COMPARISONS
The description of the Paxos, Chandra-Toueg, and
Ben-Or protocols in the previous section show that while
these protocols were originally presented as different
from one another, they share a common skeleton. Using
the instance mechanism presented in Section IV-E, each
of these protocols can be instantiated by using protocol-
specific ways of i) defining the selector quorums in each
instance, ii) starting instances, and iii) implementing
Pi.pick(r) in (S.3).
Having observed the similarities between the three
protocols, we now investigate the effect of their differ-
ences on their performance. To do this, we implemented
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the instance mechanism defined earlier, and built each
of the three protocols on top of it.
In this section, we present the implementation of these
protocols and results from our simulations.
A. Implementation
We built a replicated state machine out of the consen-
sus protocols that provides a simple logging service to
remote clients. The service consists of a set of servers
that run a consensus protocol. Clients can submit values
to any server, which will then attempt to get that value
decided in an epoch. To decide a value, a server submits
that value as a proposal associated with the current
epoch. When a value is decided in an epoch, the client
that submitted the value is informed of the epoch number
that the value was decided in, and all servers move to
the next epoch. Each server maintains an internal queue
of values that it has received from clients and attempts
to get them decided in a FIFO fashion.
For the implementation of Paxos, there is an important
design decision that was not described in the original
protocol [3]. Paxos requires a leader election mechanism
that is integral to the performance of the protocol. In our
implementation, we support two different leader election
mechanisms. First, we built a version of Paxos where
each node that wants to propose a value simply makes
itself the leader. By having each node pick instance
numbers for instances where it is the leader from a
disjoint set of instance numbers, we ensure that each
instance can only have one unique leader. We call this
version of Paxos GreedyPaxos.
We also built a second variant of Paxos which uses a
token passing mechanism to determine the leader. The
details of this protocol are outside the scope of this
paper. We call this version of Paxos TokenPaxos. in
a local variable Li. Initially, Li is set to null. Upon
receiving a valid prepare message from another node,
i.e., a prepare message for the current epoch and with an
instance number larger than any that has previously been
received, the node sets the sender of the prepare message
as the leader. To propose a value, a node sends the
proposal to the current leader. If the current leader is not
known, it makes itself the leader and starts an instance.
Each select message is tagged by the sending registrar
with a token request if that node has pending requests
in its queue and would like to receive the token in the a
subsequent epoch. Each node that sees a register message
updates a local bitmap to keep track of the list of nodes
which are requesting the token. When the current leader
commits all its local requests, it sends the token to a
random node that is requesting the token. In order to
recover from lost tokens from a crashed leader, each node
sets the value of Li to null if it does not receive any
messages from the current leader for a certain amount
of time.
For the implementation of Chandra-Toueg, we modify
the original algorithm such that all nodes are deciders in
all instances. As described in Section V-B, this avoids
requiring deciders to broadcast a decision when a value
is decided. This improves the performance of our par-
ticular application where all servers need to learn about
decisions.
All our implementations used a simple threshold
quorum system for the selector, registrar, and decider
quorums.
B. Experimental Setup
In all our experiments, the logging service consists of
a set of 10 servers. The workload is sent to the servers
via a set of 10 clients. Each client sends requests to the
servers at a rate that is described by a poisson distribution
with a mean of λc requests per minute. Client’s choice
of server to send a request to is decided randomly. All
messages between client to server and server to server
have a latency that is given by a lognormal distribution
with a mean of 100 ms and a standard deviation of 20
ms. For each set of experiments, we measure the duration
between the time that a server first receives a value from
a client to the time that the server learns that the value
has been decided.
C. Results
In the first set of experiments, we ran the server against
clients with varying loads until 100 values have been
decided by the logging service. We vary the request rate
13
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rates
from each client, λc, from 0.5 requests per minute to 14
requests per minute. We report on the mean and median
values of 100 decisions averaged over 8 runs of each
experiment. (Presenting full distributions or even just
error bars makes the data difficult to read.)
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Fig. 5. Communication overhead under varying request rates
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the mean and the median
time it takes for a single value to be decided. The graphs
show that as load increases, the time it takes for a value
to be decided increases gradually. At low loads, the
performance of all four algorithms is about equivalent.
This is because in all four algorithms, in the ideal case,
it takes four rounds of communication for a value to be
decided. This means that in the best case, it takes on
average 400 ms for value to be decided.
As load in increased, performance degrades because
there is contention between different servers to get
different values committed in the same epochs.
Note that GreedyPaxos performs consistently better
than TokenPaxos, particularly under heavy load. This
is because GreedyPaxos does not need to wait for the
token before proposing a value. Under heavy load, each
GreedyPaxos node sends a prepare message in the
beginning of each epoch without having to wait. The
node with the largest instance number wins and gets
its value decided. TokenPaxos, on the other hand, will
always decide values of the node with the token before
passing the token to the next node with requests. This
has 2 implications: i) if the leader keeps getting new
requests, other nodes can starve, and ii) one round of
communication is wasted in passing the token. This
results in worse performance.
Figure 5 shows the number of messages that each
protocol uses to commit 100 values under different
request rates. We note that Ben-Or incurs a much larger
overhead than the other protocols. This is because Ben-
Or uses a selector quorum that consists of all nodes rather
than just a leader/coordinator. This means that (R.0) and
(S.4) of the instance mechanisms send n2 messages in
each instance, rather than just n messages in Paxos and
Chandra-Toueg.
We also observe that compared to TokenPaxos,
GreedyPaxos sends more messages as load increases.
Under heavy load, each GreedyPaxos node will broad-
cast a prepare message to all other nodes in the
beginning of every round. This results in n2 messages
being sent rather than the n prepare messages that are
sent in the case of TokenPaxos. This effect is shown in
Figure 5.
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In order to investigate the performance of each pro-
tocol under crash failure, we injected failures into our
simulations. We modeled the arrival of failure events as a
poisson distribution with a rate of λf failures per minute.
When a failure event occurs, we fail a random server
until the end of the epoch. To ensure that the system is
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Fig. 8. Communication overhead under varying failure rates
able to make progress, we limit the number of failures in
an epoch to be less than half the number of servers in the
system. Keeping the request rate from clients steady at
7 requests per minute per client, we vary the failure rate
from 0.5 failures per minute to 12 failures per minute.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show mean and the median
decision latency, resp., for the the four protocols under
varying failure rates. Note that GreedyPaxos and Ben-Or
are not affected significantly by server failures. Chandra-
Toueg and TokenPaxos, on the other hand, see significant
performance degradation as the failure rate increases.
This is because Chandra-Toueg and TokenPaxos are both
dependent on timeout to recover from failures of partic-
ular nodes. In the case of Chandra-Toueg, the failure of
the coordinator requires that all registrars timeout and
move to the next instance. In the case of TokenPaxos, if
the node that is holding the token crashes, a timeout is
required to generate a new token.
A comparison study presented by Hayabashibara et
al. found that Paxos outperforms Chandra-Toueg [12]
under crash failures. We find that this result depends
on the leader election protocol used by Paxos. In our
experiments, GreedyPaxos outperforms Chandra-Toueg,
but TokenPaxos performs worse under certain failure
scenarios.
Figure 8 shows the message overhead of each protocol
under varying failure rate, clearly showing that the
number of messages sent is not affected by failures.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated that while many well-
known consensus protocols such as Paxos, Chandra-
Toueg, and Ben-Or at first appear different, they share an
underlying commonality. We distilled this commonality
into the form of a single skeleton algorithm that can
be instantiated into each of these specific protocols by
configuring the quorum systems that are used, the way
instances are started, and other protocol-specific details.
Using this approach, we implemented the skeleton algo-
rithm and used it to instantiate Ben-Or, Chandra-Toueg,
and two variants of the Paxos algorithm. Simulation
experiments using our implementation allowed us to
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explore the effect of the differences between these al-
gorithms on their performance under different workloads
and crash failures. We believe that the skeleton algorithm
is an interesting basis for the understanding of consensus
algorithms and comparison of their performance, and
provides a novel platform for the exploration of other
possible consensus protocols.
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